The Ardennes

The Ardennes Forest is an area of rolling hills where Belgium, France and Luxembourg meet. In 1944 it was also the dividing line between the British forces in the north and the American forces in the south.

In the last days of 1944, Hitler demanded a final German offensive. The goal of the offensive was the Belgian port of Antwerp. To reach it, the German army would push through the Ardennes in an attempt to split the American and British forces.

The German generals knew they could not reach Antwerp and pleaded with Hitler for a more modest objective. But Hitler, who was one of the greatest assets to the Allies' cause, once again refused to listen to his best advisors. He insisted that the plan not be modified.

The Americans dubbed this the Battle of the Bulge. The stubborn defence of Bastonge made by the American 101st Airborne Division (Screaming Eagles) deserves much of the credit for stopping Hitler's last big push.

Preparation For Battle

On 8 December General Kurt Student was given eight days notice to launch an airborne attack in support of the 6th Panzer Army. The man he chose to lead the battalion-sized attack was Colonel Freiherr Friedrich-August von der Heydte. His job would be to gather a force of 1000 men, to drop deep behind the American lines in order to capture a series of important road junctions. He had only a week to do it. Hitler ordered each of the parachute regiment commanders to send von der Heydte 100 of his best men.

But the German Parachute Corps of 1944 was not the highly trained soldiers who jumped into Crete in 1941. Many of the men sent to von der Heydte’s command were the "bad apples" of the other parachute units. Only about 20% of these troops were qualified to jump with weapons, so containers had to be used. To add to his woes, von der Heydte was given 100 Junkers 52s whose crews were mainly young and inexperienced.

The Jump

On 15 December von der Heydte received his final briefing at 6th Panzer Army Headquarters. The P-Hr (Parachute Hour) was set for 0200hrs on the 16th. He had only 12 hours to issue his own orders. This would be the first operational night jump for the German paratroops.

By midnight of the 15th only about a quarter of the paratroops had reached the airfield. The trucks that were to transport them failed to show up. The parachute landing was postponed but Operation Kondor went ahead as planned. In the centre and the south the 5th and 7th Armies made good progress, but in the north the 6th Army became bogged down with armoured columns backed up on the roads. Despite this lack of progress, von der Heydte's men were dropped into battle on the second night. The surface winds were 36 miles per hour. Casualty rates on landing were more than ten percent. The dropzone was in a wooded area, for which the Germans regularly practiced.

To assist the inexperienced Ju52 crews several navigation aids were used including searchlights and tracer fire from anti-aircraft guns. But, partly due to a strong headwind, once the planes crossed over the Allies lines they began to get separated. Flares dropped from a Meserschmitt fighter a few minutes before P-Hour marked the dropzone. Few of the pilots saw them and only ten of the planes dropped their troops accurately. Von der Heydte's men were scattered across the countryside. Three hours after the drop only 100 paratroops were in the rendezvous.

The Battle

As day broke on the 17th von der Heydte still did not have an effective fighting force. With only 350 men, no support weapons and no radios, he spent the day laying low and sending out small patrols. The Germans captured a few prisoners but had no way to process them so they were sent back to the American lines with the German wounded. Von der Heydte sent a personal note to the American commander, Maxwell Taylor whom he had fought in Normandy, asking him to care for his wounded. The task of capturing the crossroads to delay the American re-enforcements was abandoned. The paratroops broke into small groups and spent the next few days either laying ambushes or trying to evade American patrols. It was not long before they were all captured.

The effect of having German paratroops scattered across the American rear area helped to tie up reserve forces for a short while but overall the mission must be seen as a failure. The jump was a disaster. Paratroops were spread out up to 20 miles apart, many were injured on landing due to the high winds and some were not found until months later when the spring thaw came. This was the end of German parachute operations in World War II.

Lessons Learned

In 1940/41 the Wehrmacht showed the world what Paratroops could do. Their planning and execution were impeccable. This operation showed what happens when you try to throw an airborne operation together at the last minute. The supporting elements were an important factor as well. Beginning with the trucks that failed to show up to take the paratroops to the airfield. Then, most critical, the inexperienced aircrews who could not find the dropzone in the dark. Although they had trained for nighttime parachuting, doing it under operational conditions is very difficult. This operation underscores the need for paratroops and aircrews to work closely together to ensure skills are kept up.

It also re-enforces the need that airborne soldiers have for their own support weapons. Elan and daring can only count for so much. To be truly effective paratroops must have the firepower to get the job done. Even when ground link up is planned for shortly after a jump, paratroops need integral fire support. Rapid link up can never be guaranteed.

Radios too proved to be a problem. The plan called for long range artillery support from the German lines but the radio of the Forward Observation Officer (FOO) did not work after landing. To make matters worse, the signals platoon were all loaded on one or two aircraft and they missed the proper dropzone. Von der Heydte was about eight miles from the German ground forces but had no way to contact them.

Every Airborne operation must have a specific mission, but all Airborne operations also have a strategic purpose as well. The threat of an airborne force landing in a rear area causes security problems for any army. Reserves must be held back to deal with the potential threat. In the Ardennes this strategic function of airborne troops was far surpassed by a new security threat. This was the operation where 30 men of Otto Skorzeny's Special Force dressed in American uniforms and drove around in American jeeps. Their effect on rear area security was much greater. All movement in the American rear was slowed by checkpoints set up to verify everyone identity.

Good Airborne Stories That Might Even Be True

The German commander, von der Heydte, was recovering from a serious car accident. His left arm and shoulder were still in a splint, but he continued to jump. He led his men into battle by using a captured Russian parachute. It was steerable so he could pick his landing site and avoid further injury.

Crete

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